Abstract. Web technologies provide several means to infringe user privacy. This is especially true when customers buying tangible goods submit orders that contain their real identity and physical address. Then, in practice, the vendor can link this information with all information gathered about the customer, obtained through various means. In this paper, we present a solution that is based on mobile agents and a new infrastructure consisting of a mobile agent base station and a cardinality observer. This infrastructure can be used to prevent the vendor from directly linking information gathered about the customer with identifying information usually contained in the customer's order. The vendor can only assign customers to their correct profiles with some probability which depends on the number of candidate profiles. The new infrastructure allows the customer to decrease this probability in several ways. The usage of both the cardinality observer and the mobile agent base station deterministically guarantees to the customer that an agent only starts its journey when a desired threshold for the linking probability has been reached. In a second variant using only the mobile agent base station, the linking probability is decreased in a probabilistic manner by introducing a fixed delay before mobile agent release.
Introduction
Privacy threats and problems in the context of electronic commerce are extensively discussed in literature since the discovery of the economical importance of the Internet. In academic work done so far, solutions were mostly proposed for those cases in which the trade objects are restricted to intangible goods, e.g., see [2, 11] . There, all phases of a typical business process consisting of search, order, pay, and deliver can be performed electronically. As a consequence, technical means developed so far for communication networks can be used to protect a customer's privacy, e.g., anonymity networks [9, 12] .
When dealing with tangible goods -e.g., books, CDs-, these techniques can also be used. In the search phase, when the buyer browses through the product catalog, anonymity networks can be used to prevent re-identification and to protect the buyer against some threats, e.g., price discrimination. But unfortunately, these techniques cannot be used to prevent linkability between the phases which allows the vendor to learn much more about the buyer than necessary for carrying out the business process.
In practice, in order to receive a tangible good a buyer has to reveal his identity and address to the vendor for reasons of delivery. It is not realistic to assume that either all buyers get their ordered goods in a poste restante manner where the identity of a buyer can remain hidden, or that an additional third party receives the package on behalf of the buyer in order to hide his identity. Thus, the vendor learns at least who is buying what. But presently, the vendor can learn much more. Since the vendor can link the data given to him during the order phase to the buyer's activities during the search phase, the vendor gets much deeper insight into the buyer's interests than necessary for the following phases of the business process. This situation can be compared to physical world scenarios, where one is being completely traced while walking through a shop before going to the cash desk. The vendor's ability to link these two phases is achieved by using several tracking mechanisms.
The goal of this work is to present a convenient solution that prevents the vendor from linking data collected during the search phase with data obtained in the order phase of the same business process. In this work, we propose a mobile agent system and a specific infrastructure to solve the problems described above. Instead of filling goods into a virtual trolley during the search phase, the customer inserts the order information into a mobile agent. This agent is send to a central mobile agent base station, a component of our infrastructure, which is permanently online. From this base station, the agent starts its journey. After having finished its tasks it returns to its base station.
The solution provides some additional useful features. By using another infrastructure component, the cardinality observer, it can be guaranteed that the agent is only sent when a desired number of candidates has been reached. As a direct consequence, this results in a linking probability that is below a specific value. In another weaker approach, the buyer can define a certain delay between the transfer of the agent and the start time of the agent's journey. Thus, there is the possibility to increase the cardinality of the group of potential candidates to be associated to a product, and thereby reducing the linking probability for the vendor in a probabilistic way. Another advantage of our solution results from mobile agent functionality. Due to its capability to actively make decisions with regard to results that were created on its journey, it is possible to define orders depending on the availability of products from previous orders of the same shopping tour.
Tracking Users
The vendor's ability for linking buyer activities can be based on several technical possibilities for tracking them in HTTP communication. Here, tracking means the reidentification of a user subsequently sending requests to a server. We can distinguish between the re-identification of users in distinct sessions and the re-identification of users within one session, possibly in different phases.
Profiles
As long as customers do not prevent the vendor from tracking them the vendor is able to record profiles. Such profiles can be understood as a sequence of requests for resourceslike web pages-that can be associated with one session, and thereby with one customer, using the methods presented below. Eventually, the vendor's database contains a variety of profiles prof 1 , . . . , prof m that could be exploited afterwards. When a customer clicks on products p 1 , . . . , p ν while browsing through the catalog, then prof i = (p 1 , . . . , p ν ) can be created. In the following, we show several possibilities for user tracking, suitable for creating profiles and associating profiles with customer identities. In general, user tracking can be achieved by exploiting specifics of the underlying transport protocol(s), or by specially created content. In both cases, certain protocol and/or content elements can be used to introduce a so called hidden channel.
Tracking by Protocol
IP Addresses. The first means to link the business process' phases is given by IP addresses. One possibility to cope with this problem from the customer's perspective is to disconnect in order to conduct the order phase with a new IP address obtained from his ISP after re-connecting -a solution which is not very convenient. Another option for the buyer to solve the problem could be the use of an anonymity network based on mixes [8, 12] in order to hide his own IP address from the vendor. But if all requests are routed via the same sequence of mixes the probability for correct linking on the vendor side can be very high. They can be correlated with the IP address of the last mix in the chain. Another possibility for the buyer to hide his own IP address could be the use of the crowds approach where routes of subsequent messages can be different with high probability [9] . But all these anonymization countermeasures can be circumvented if a vendor uses cookies or dynamically generates URLs that allow session binding since anonymity networks do not protect against tracking through higher layer protocols. Cookies. Another means to track the buyer and to link the phases is given by cookies [6] . As a countermeasure, a buyer may refuse cookies. But for shopping applications, they are often required. In a more laborious way, the buyer could first browse through the product catalog, then delete his cookies, and afterwards come back to the desired products and fill them in the virtual trolley without any further detours. Beside the inconvenience of this, the vendor can still track the buyer with the method presented below. Dynamic URLs. The concept of a session has been introduced to HTTP through dynamic URLs. There, a part of the URL which is returned to a customer is unique in a sense that distinct requestors of the same web resource can be distinguished via this reference. This allows a web server to track a customer. A countermeasure for this would be to shut down the browser after the search phase and restart it in order to go directly to the order phase.
The previous considerations show, that presently there are only inconvenient solutions for the buyer to prevent a vendor from undesired linking.
Tracking by Content
A less obvious and more subtle method for tracking users is using the content information that a user requests. Using content tracking, a vendor serves all of its customers slightly different content in one phase in order to use this content in a subsequent phase (for re-identification of the same customer), when the content, or a part of it, is resent to the vendor. For instance, it is possible to associate a profile created in the search phase with a specific buyer from the order phase, if such content is presented in the order, no matter how carefully the buyer avoided all protocol tracking.
Product identifiers. One way of identifying a buyer's search phase a posteriori is using specially encoded product identifiers (PIDs). Such an identifier could contain a static part that refers to the product and a dynamic part that identifies a certain search phase. Since customers are used to numeric PIDs, they will not notice that they are given information leaking PIDs.
Prices. By giving different customers different prices, prices can also be used for the purpose of linking phases when contained in an order. In contrast to PIDs, prices only allow unique re-identification in theory. In practice, a vendor only has a finite range of prices which customers are willing to pay for a given product. If this range is depleted it is necessary to re-use some of the prices, and thereby uniqueness is lost.
Product ordering. Another method for content tracking is correlating the sequence in which products were clicked in the search phase with the product sequence submitted in a buyer's order. This is possible, since the ordered goods normally appear in the vendor's collected profile -possibly interleaved by other products that have been viewed but not ordered-in exactly the same sequence as in the buyer's order. As with prices, using product ordering for mapping profiles to buyers is probabilistic, since there can be several candidates.
Threats to Privacy
In today's web practice, we can identify a lack of privacy enhancing technologies [3] . It can be assumed that this lack of adequate privacy enhancing technologies is an additional barrier for the diffusion of e-commerce applications [4, 13] . Thus, there is a need to change the present situation by the introduction of new technical solutions that allow to avoid, or to reduce the invasion of privacy.
In practice, a customer that decides to buy a tangible good electronically, usually has to reveal his identity and address to the vendor in order to allow delivery. Thus, a vendor clearly learns who is buying what. But by tracking the user through the whole business process, the vendor learns much more, e.g., what other products the customer is interested in. This data can be used to enrich the customer's profile stored in the vendor's database, and thereby, to obtain a more profound basis for customer categorization to be used for data mining.
Mobile Agents
Mobile agents are autonomous programs, which migrate through a network of sites to accomplish tasks or take orders on behalf of their owners. The owner of an agent can instruct it to visit many hosts in a network, and thereby execute some desired tasks for him. After having carried out all instructions, the agent returns to its base station and delivers the results it collected during its journey to its owner. One of the advantages for using mobile agent technology is that transaction costs for the agent owner are remarkably reduced since after leaving its owner it migrates from one host to the next autonomously. Thus, during this period the owner is not required to maintain his online connection to the network. In the past years, lots of work has been done in the area of mobile agents and there is a variety of mobile agent systems, e.g., Aglets [7] .
In the following, we will not focus on a specific mobile agent system. We will consider mobile agents in a rather abstract way. This means that exclusively those components of mobile agents will be considered which are of special relevance for the solution presented in this paper. In our level of abstraction a mobile agent a consists of the following components: a = (bc, r, d, δ). The component bc denotes the binary code of the agent to be executed. Furthermore, r describes the mobile agent's route as an (n + 1)-tuple (with n ≥ 1) consisting of host addresses ad(s i ) that have to be visited on the agent's journey: r = (ad(s 1 ), . . . , ad(s n ), ad(bs)). This route is given by the agent owner. The agent starts its journey at a base station bs where it returns to when it has visited the stations contained in the route. Since the first migration is bs → s 1 , the first route entry is given by ad(s 1 ). The component d denotes the data given by the agent owner. This data will be used as input for the computations at the hosts s 1 , . . . , s n on the agent's journey. Thus, we can think of it as
The data obtained as an output of the computations are contained in δ. Similarly, we have here δ = (δ 1 , . . . , δ n ).
Adaption of Agent Components
In the following, we will adapt the previously introduced components of a mobile agent according to the requirements of our solution. Thereby, the main protection goal we have in mind is privacy. Additionally, we also focus on data origin authentication which includes data integrity of the mobile agent, and non-repudiation.
In order to do this, we introduce some expressions. Let E ei (d i ) denote a ciphertext obtained via an asymmetric algorithm E, e.g., RSA [10] , for the encryption of the data d i by using s i 's public key e i . Furthermore, Sig x (y 1 , . . . , y ν ) denotes a digital signature of party x on some contents y 1 , . . . , y ν . This allows us to introduce an elementd consisting of encrypted input data for s 1 , . . . , s n and a signature of the agent owner b which will be the buyer:
). Furthermore, we protect the agent route in a similar way as it was done in [14] by an onion-like encryption concept. In each layer of the onion structure we have a host address and a signature by the agent owner b on this address combined with other agent components.
ad(bs))
The principle of how to deal withr is as follows. The base station learns through the first entry ofr where to dispatch the agent. Before the agent is sent to s 1 , bs deletes this entry fromr. When s 1 receives the agent with the newr, it decrypts the ciphertext contained in r and obtains the successor address ad(s 2 ), a signature, and a further ciphertext. Before sending the agent to s 2 , the address and the signature are deleted fromr. This procedure will be repeated until the agent arrives at s n−1 . Here the last decryption is necessary, i.e., s n−1 gets the last address ad(s n ) and signature contained in the onion. After deletion of these parameters fromr, the agent is sent to bs as defined by the last entry ad(bs). The idea of the route protection is that visited hosts do not learn to which hosts the agent migrates to except their respective predecessor and successor. If the agent owner has the interest that visited hosts do not get information about other hosts contained in the route, he can introduce dummy hosts in the route that just forward the agent.
The signatures contained inr andd provide data integrity, and allow that modifications can be detected. The signatures depend on several agent components that prevent attackers from the exchange of components taken from different agents belonging to the same agent owner b.
After having produced the computation results δ i at host s i , they will be signed by bc,d) ). At the end of the journey, the agent contains all computation results, i.e.,δ = (δ 1 , . . . ,δ n ). Initially, portionsδ i are empty. In the following, we assume that an agentã consists of the following components: a = (bc,r,d,δ).
Achieving Privacy via Agents
In the following, we show how to prevent a vendor from linking gathered information about a buyer obtained by tracking him during the search phase with his real identity when he submits an order. In 6.1, we show how to deliver an order with an agent. In 6.2 and 6.3, we explain how different kinds of tracking are prevented. In 6.4, we point out how the linking probability for the vendor can be decreased by using functionalities of the new infrastructure components. Routes containing several vendor addresses are discussed in 6.5.
Order Delivery via Agents
For simplicity, we assume that a buyer b decides to buy at just one vendor, say s 1 . While searching through s 1 's catalog, b has a look at various products, and finally decides to buy a subset p 1 , . . . , p k of these products. During this time, s 1 can track b's activities and store them in a new profile, say prof i , which belongs to a single identity, but he is unable to map these activities to b's identity. Then, b creates the order information including identifiers of these products, his name and address, to be contained in d 1 
In a next step, b will transferã to the base station bs and instruct it to dispatchã. This base station is maintained by a specialized mobile agent base provider. This provider does not play the role of a trusted third party in the usual sense. In fact, the buyer's trust in the provider is rather minimal. Since the provider does not get any information about the search phase, he cannot exploit this information for himself nor pass it to others. This is due to the fact that the agents do not contain information like IP address, cookie information, or dynamic URLs that can be exploited by the vendor for linking. The provider is trusted that he does not give the buyer's IP address to the vendor, that he does not delete agents after having received them, and that he does not release the agents earlier as declared (to become clear later). Now,ã can migrate to s 1 and deliver its data d 1 . Since d 1 is encrypted asymmetrically, it can only be opened by s 1 , i.e., bs does not learn which products were ordered by b. Furthermore, s 1 can check by verifying the signature if the order was undeniably created by b and if it was modified. When the data contained in the agent does not seem to be corrupted, s 1 creates the output Sig s1 (δ 1 , bc,d) ) to be handed over to the agent. E.g., such a computation output could be s 1 's confirmation of having received the order and a declaration of carrying it out immediately. For integrity reasons, all outputs should be signed by the vendor. Afterwards, the agent is sent to bs according to the last route entry ad(bs). There,ã waits for b until he connects the next time to bs.
Tracking by Protocol
Using our mobile agent approach, the vendor cannot use IP addresses, cookies, or dynamic URLs for linking the received order to search phase activities, since he is no more directly receiving the order from the buyer b. In order to get a deeper insight into b's interests, s 1 can try to link available profile data prof 1 , prof 2 , . . . with the data obtained from the agent to find out b's real profile P rof ile(b). But this means for him to carry out a random experiment, assuming there is no other information that allows linking. Since b has ordered p 1 , . . . , p k , the vendor searches in his database for profiles that include p 1 , . . . , p k and that have been recorded in a relevant time interval. Certainly, the order does not belong to a profile that has been recorded one year ago. If we assume that s 1 finds µ ≥ 1 profiles prof 1 , . . . , prof µ each containing at least p 1 , . . . , p k , then for s 1 the probability for correct linking of a stored profile to b is given by P (P rof ile(b) = prof i ) = 1 µ , provided that there is no other hidden information that makes linking easier. The probability depends on the number µ of profile candidates. Obviously, µ decreases monotonically when k increases, i.e., including a higher number of products in the order can increase the linking probability.
Tracking by Content
Since content tracking is not easily detectable per se, we are introducing certain rules and procedures that must be followed in order to prevent content tracking, or at least make it detectable by a buyer.
Product identifiers.
A malicious vendor could offer such an agent-based privacy protecting service and still try to link the search and order activities via leaking product IDs (PIDs). In such a case, the linking probability for the vendor would be P (P rof ile(b) = prof i ) = 1. In order to prevent such attacks, PIDs must be verifiable by the buyer in a sense that hidden channels become obvious. E.g., this could be achieved by some natural language encoding of PIDs. In such a scheme, the set of potential candidates for PIDs is rather small, e.g., for a music CD the PID could be (artist name, title) instead of some ID B0000262WI and therefore, a customer can detect with high probability if there is some hidden information.
Prices. Another possibility to increase the linking probability could be achieved via variable pricing strategies. E.g., an unfair vendor could offer the same product at slightly differing prices. When he later receives an order that contains the price presented in the offer then the vendor can easily exclude all those profiles from the potential set of candidates in which he offered the specific product for a different price. If the buyer does not send the prices the vendor might sell him the ordered goods at (theoretically) any price. In order to prevent this, we propose that the vendor gives a temporary price guarantee for any product he sells, i.e., he commits himself to charge a fixed price for a given product for some period of time. This could be realised, e.g., by creating and publishing a vendor-signed document that contains the products, their respective prices, and the validity period. This guarantee can be downloaded by the buyer and be kept for later reference. Of course, the concept using guarantees only works in cases where prices do not change too frequently. If a vendor serves customers with distinct price guarantees in order to track them, then he does not know the exact prices at which he offered his products to a specific customer. Thus, if he is trying to identify a buyer by his offered prices, the vendor can only guess the price a customer expects according to his downloaded guarantee. Should the vendor make a wrong guess to the buyers disadvantage, he could present his price guarantee, proving that the vendor tried to deceive him. In this case, since the price guarantee is disclosed, the vendor would be able to link a profile to the customer. However, disputes are unattractive for the vendor because if they occur frequently the vendor's reputation will degrade. In addition, if the vendor makes a wrong guess to the buyer's advantage, i.e., billing him for a lower price than he expected, then he will surely accept and the vendor lowers his profit and also would link to a wrong profile.
Product ordering. In order to counter the effects of correlating the click sequence prof i from the search phase with the product ordering in the order, the buyer should have the possibility to arrange the PIDs in an arbitrary sequence. This sequence can be randomly created, or obtained by sorting the PIDs, e.g., in lexicographic order. This is sufficient as long as there are other profiles stored in s 1 's database produced by other customers that also viewed at least p 1 , . . . , p k in one session and therefore help to decrease the vendor's linking probability.
Decreasing Probability for Linking
In the following, we will show how a buyer can decrease the linking probability. Since this probability depends on the number µ of candidates it is the goal to have large µ. One solution would be to motivate a large community to visit the vendor's catalog. But this is not realistic. In the following, we provide two solutions that allow buyers to hide their profiles in larger groups.
Start of Journey Dependent on Time.
We propose that the base station should provide a service for the buyer to define a delay between receiving the agent from the buyer and dispatching it, eventually. Since this delay is unknown to the vendor, he does not know whether to link the order with profiles stored in the past minutes, hours, or even days. In order to have the correct profile with high probability in the set of candidates, the time interval considered by the vendor should be large. But then, µ can also be assumed to have increased. Of course this depends on the specific statistics of the vendor's web site. The dispatching time can be specified by the buyer by instructing the base station not to release the agent before a delay ∆τ , or not before a time MM:dd:hh:mm. When price guarantees are used, the delay must not exceed the validity period of the price guarantee.
This solution only requires the existence of the base station. But on the other hand, there is no guarantee that the number of profile candidates is high enough. This guarantee is achieved by using the cardinality observer.
Start of Journey Driven by Cardinality.
A delay still bears the risk of re-identification if the number of candidates µ is still relatively small or even one. In that case, a buyer b might not want to submit his order until µ reaches a certain threshold t, i.e., there is a group of µ ≥ t customers that also viewed the products p 1 , . . . , p k -maybe beside others-to be bought by b. Thus, there is a need to measure µ in order to control the linking probability. For that, we propose two approaches. The first one, described as perfect counting, is accurate on the size of µ, however, possibly requires higher transaction costs. The second approach, called partial counting, is based on an estimate µ ≤ µ by counting only profiles of those customers that ordered some products. Thus, customers that only viewed the products are not counted. This approach yields almost no additional transaction costs. Both approaches require a new infrastructure component, the cardinality observer co. The co counts the number of times specific sets of products from some vendor have been viewed within distinct sessions. This also ensures that products are not double counted, for instance, when a customer views a product again within the same session. Beside its counting facilities, co offers a notification service in order to inform bs that the desired threshold t for a specific agent has been reached. The co is trusted to send only honest notifications, i.e., it will not send a notification before t has been reached. In the following, we assume that both parties playing the roles of bs and co are distinct and that they are trusted not to collude.
Perfect Counting. In our first approach, a customer b sends messages containing his profile data -products p 1 , . . . , p ν he viewed at some vendor v-to bs and forwards some non-identifying part of this data to co. This forwarded data is protected in a way that the customer identity remains hidden to co while the content remains hidden to bs. This can be achieved by a mechanism in which the buyer encrypts this data with co's public key in order to hide the products from bs. The sequence of messages takes the form E co (rand 1 , v, p 1 ) (rand 2 , v, p 1 , . . . , p k , t) to co that contains a random number rand 2 , the vendor v, the products to be bought p 1 , . . . , p k , and b's preferences for the minimal size t of candidates regarding these products. Here, rand 2 serves as a temporary agent ID for that agent which waits at bs to be released when the number of candidates has reached t. Of course, the set of candidates is not always growing. If candidate profiles become too old, they should not be considered anymore.
In this approach, co essentially learns the same information from the search phase as the vendor, hence, it has perfect knowledge regarding the vendor's linking probability. However, in contrast to the vendor, co is never given b's name and therefore it cannot link the obtained profile to b's identity. Thus, co cannot exploit this data in order to infringe b's privacy. Furthermore, bs does not get aware of b's profile data or b's order data. This approach clearly increases transaction costs since IDs of products viewed by c are transferred to co in order to allow accurate counting.
Partial Counting. In this approach, b does not send his profile data p 1 , . . . , p ν to co via bs while he is searching through the vendor site. Instead, he stores his profile data locally and transfers them to bs together with the agent in case he decides to order some products p 1 , . . . , p k . Of course, both the order data and the profile data are protected so that bs does not become aware of them. This is achieved by embedding a ciphertext E co (v, (p 1 , . . . , p k ), (p 1 , . . . , p ν ), t) into the agent. After the agent has been transferred to bs, bs extracts this message and forwards it to co together with a bs-chosen agent ID. This agent ID is necessary in order to notify bs which agent should be released. Also here, b hides his identity from co.
Using this method, bs must only send one additonal message compared to the approach with fixed delay where we do not have a co. Compared to the approach for perfect counting, here the costs for sending messages can be drastically reduced. However, this approach is possibly less accurate than the former one, since here only customers that finally ordered some products are considered by co instead of the possibly larger set of customers which viewed these products. Hence, when a customer orders p 1 , . . . , p k , then co will notify the corresponding agent to start its journey when the condition µ ≥ t becomes true, where µ is the number of customers that also ordered p 1 , . . . , p kpotentially beside other products. Clearly, µ ≤ µ, where µ is the number of profiles containing p 1 , . . . , p k which were recorded by the vendor. This means that agents will be delayed longer than necessary because the threshold t might have already been crossed since non-buying customers are ignored. Also here, the number of relevant candidates µ may be reduced when profiles should not be considered anymore.
Start of Journey Dependent on Combination of Delay and Cardinality.
The ideas of the previous considerations can be combined in order to trigger the start of the agent journey. With this, it is possible that an agent can be released when at least one of both conditions is satisfied -time or cardinality. E.g., co can notify bs to release the agent when the desired cardinality threshold has been reached even though the delay given to bs is not reached. In this case, it is not necessary for the agent to wait longer, and the buyer may get the ordered goods earlier. In the opposite case, when the desired delay is reached without satisfying the cardinality condition, the agent starts its journey even if the linking probability ist still too large. By this combination, the buyer can make sure that the delivery of the ordered products will not be delayed indefinitely.
Routes with Several Shops
So far, we have considered only cases in which a mobile agent exclusively visits one vendor for delivering some order information. Shopping tours with several vendors can be advantageous, e.g., in cases when an order for vendor s i should only be ordered if products at s j , to be visited before, are available. Furthermore, this possibility reduces the number of mobile agents migrating through the network. Concerning the order information transfered by the agent, there arise no privacy problems since this information can only be opened by the desired vendor because of asymmetric encryption.
One could argue that with longer routes vendors learn which other hosts have to be visited on the shopping tour which gives some further insight into the buyers behaviour or interests. But this threat can be tackled with the route protection scheme presented in expression (1) . With this solution, a vendor only learns about his predecessor and successor in the shopping tour. If a buyer does not like that a vendor gets aware of other shops that could be predecessor or successor then the buyer could create the agent routẽ r with intermediate bs. This increases the number of migration steps on the agent's journey but allows the buyer to enhance his privacy.
In the case of dependent agent computations -e.g., when order delivery at s i depends on computation results at s j -results have to be communicated from one vendor to another. If one is immediately following the other then the exchange of the required results can be done directly -provided that the buyer is willing to reveal these shopping tour stations to the vendors. If the buyer decides to hide the vendor identity from other vendors by agent exchange via bs, then the results can be encrypted for bs which decrypts and re-encrypts them for the vendor that requires these results. By applying such concepts, it can be achieved that a vendor will not get aware of what b is ordering at other vendors as far as the vendors are not colluding and exchange their trading information.
Architecture
In the following, we will sketch the architecture including the infrastructure components that are needed for our solution. Figure 1 depicts the basic components which are required in our system. The customer uses a simple web browser and the Customer Local Agent Station (CLAS) which is a specific component of our solution. The vendor runs a usual web server and a Vendor Agent Station (VAS). Additionally, there is the Mobile Agent Base Station (MABS) which is provided by a third party that offers mobile agent services to customers. And finally, we have the Cardinality Observer (CO) operated by another third party.
Customer Components
The customer is running two applications: a browser and a CLAS. The CLAS component is independent of a specific vendor. The CLAS software is provided by a party that is trusted to not have embedded a Trojan horse in it. The CLAS comprises several functionalities: (1) a client-side proxy, (2) a Product Selector (PS) from which products can be put into a trolley-like agent, (3) a Mobile Agent Generation (MAG) component like an agent workbench, and (4) a client to use the services of the MABS.
When the customer browses through the vendor catalog all requests are first sent to the CLAS (figure 2, message 1) which forwards them to the vendor system (figure 2, message 2). The corresponding vendor response is received by the CLAS (figure 2, . Message 3 consists of a part destined to the CLAS and another part destined to the browser. After having extracted his own part, the CLAS forwards the remaining message part to the browser (figure 2, message 4). The browser message part consists of normal web page content, e.g., displaying products with some additional information. The CLAS message part consists of the product identifiers for the same products which are displayed at the same time by the browser. These identifiers are displayed by the PS subcomponent. In contrast to normal scenarios, when the customer decides to buy a product, he does not put it in some virtual trolley by clicking in the browser window. The browser window is just used to get product information and to navigate through the catalog. Instead, he takes the product ID from the PS and transfers it to the MAG. On this agent workbench, the customer composes the agent in the desired manner, i.e., he has to select the appropriate agent from the set of potential candidates. Then, he has to create the input data while respecting the constraints which exist on the shopping tour, e.g., buy at shop B only if the order at shop A can be fulfilled. Such constraints influence the order of hosts to be visited, and thus, have to be considered when the agent route is composed. After having selected an appropriate order of shops, the CLAS re-arranges the sequence of the selected products as described in subsection 6.3, and then the MAG automatically creates a route according to equation (1) . The CLAS is also responsible for the creation of profile messages which are destined for the CO. In case of perfect counting, it also sends them to the MABS. In case of partial counting, it embeds them into the agent.
After having finished the shopping tour, the buyer transfers the agent to the MABS (figure 2, message 5). Then, he can also give some additional instructions, such as the agent release delay, and the threshold.
Mobile Agent Base Station
The MABS provides a docking station for an agent, as well as an alarm clock and relaying/sending/receiving facilities. The alarm clock is used to wake up the agent after a pre-determined period of time in the case when the agent's start is controlled by a delay. Message relay is needed if the MABS supports cardinality driven schemes with perfect counting, sending is required if a MABS supports partial counting. In both cases 
Fig. 2. CLAS and browser interaction
the MABS receives the notification message from the CO, and the MABS has to map the notification to the correct agent. When any condition for the agent release is satisfied, the MABS lets the agent start its journey. When the agent returns to the MABS after its journey, it is stored in a personal inbox which is only accessible by the corresponding buyer. After the receipt of the agent, the MABS can inform the buyer that the agent has returned and can now be picked up. Then, the buyer can connect to the MABS and download the agent in order to verify the results of its journey. Therefore, the MAG also comprises the necessary functionality for decrypting the data which were encrypted for the customer by the visited vendors.
Cardinality Observer
The main goal of the CO is to send notifications for agent releases when desired thresholds are reached. This means that the CO has to keep track of all relevant profiles obtained from customers via the MABS. Beside a profile prof i , the CO has to store the time τ i at which the corresponding profile was received -as will become clear soon. Therefore, all pairs (prof i , τ i ) belonging to a vendor v are stored in some vendor-specific set If a buyer orders p 1 , . . . , p k from v, then the CO has to check if p 1 , . . . , p k are contained as a whole at least t times in prof 1 , . . . , prof m . As soon as the check result is positive, then the release of the corresponding agent containing the order for p 1 , . . . , p k will be initiated at the MABS.
It is important that cardinality checks should not be based on profiles which are too old, since such checks could lead to undesired consequences. E.g., if a buyer sends an order for which t − 1 matching profiles are stored at the CO all of which are older than a year, this new profile would trigger the agent's release. But in such a case, the vendor would be able to link the profile correctly, since he would probably not use such old profiles for linking. Thus, at time τ an old profile prof i with time τ i < τ − ∆T should not be considered in the cardinality check, i.e., these entries should be deleted from S v . There, ∆T is a parameter that has to be defined by the CO.
Vendor Components
On the vendor side, the solution requires a Vendor Agent Station (VAS) beside the usual vendor infrastructure. This VAS provides all the required functionality that is necessary for the interaction with the customer agents generated by the customer, i.e., basic agent execution facilities and required security mechanisms as previously explained. Furthermore, the vendor has to provide messages that consist of a CLAS part and a browser part. Whenever a customer requests product information of potentially ordered goods by using mobile agents, the vendor's web server responds with adequate messages which can be processed by the CLAS.
By using the CLAS for selecting the product to be ordered in the proposed way, we can be sure that no hidden channel is established to the vendor. Hidden channels could be possible when a buyer selects a product directly from a browser. Such a hidden channel would increase the linking probability by reducing the set of candidates to those parties that really selected the corresponding products. But our solution deals with a set of potential candidates containing all those parties that only viewed or finally decided to buy the product.
Related Work
Other work done in the area of privacy protection also focusing on the prevention of exploiting server log files can be found in anonymity literature, e.g., see [8, 9, 12] . Typically, in anonymity the goal is on sender anonymity, receiver anonymity, and unlinkability of sender and receiver. There, the focus is not on the question on how to avoid linkability of subsequent messages exchanged between a customer and a web server. Since we are dealing with applications in which the buyer reveals his identity in some phase of the business relationship, we require this unlinkability of messages exchanged in distinct phases. Most of the work done so far (e.g., [2, 11] ) was dealing with online selling. There, the focus for privacy protection has exclusively been on the trade of intangible goods where anonymity networks can be used without problems. This means that no real identity and physical address have to be revealed.
Other work dealing with privacy protection concerning gathering information on customer activities in business processes was presented in [1, 5] . There, they deal with privacy protection in customization and targeting.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a solution which allows a buyer of tangible goods to enhance his privacy. Our solution applies mobile agents and a new infrastructure in order to prevent a vendor from linking information gathered in the search and order phase of the business process. For the vendor, the linking of these activities is a random experiment. The success probability of this experiment depends on the number of customers that have viewed the corresponding products. The proposed system and the new infrastructure components allow the introduction of distinct variants like agent delay and cardinality control which both have advantageous effects on the linking probability. Furthermore, we have considered the case of shopping tours in which an agent delivers orders to several vendors. The proposed solution can be implemented in existing electronic shops where tangible goods are sold in order to enhance the privacy of the buyer.
Potential problems regarding attacks on the cardinality observer need to be resolved in future work.
